An Israeli missile before making impact in Gaza. Photo credit: AFP
But Hamas’s ambitions stretched beyond Gaza. The group actively sought the financial and military support of regional powers, particularly Iran. As early as June 2021, Sinwar had written to Iranian officials, seeking financial assistance to fund what would eventually become the October 7 attack. “We promise you that we will not waste a minute or a penny unless it takes us toward achieving this sacred goal,” Sinwar reportedly wrote.
This request yielded an initial $10 million in funding, and later, Hamas asked for a staggering $500 million to be distributed over two years.
Change In Strategy
Though the attack was initially scheduled for late 2022, Hamas postponed it for over a year. According to documents obtained by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and shared with The Washington Post, this delay was largely due to ongoing efforts to enlist more substantial help from Iran and Hezbollah.
In August 2023, Hamas’s deputy, Khalil al-Hayya, allegedly travelled to Lebanon to meet with a senior commander in Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Mohammed Said Izadi, to discuss the operational details of the assault. Izadi expressed Iran and Hezbollah’s tentative support but said that they needed more time to “prepare the environment” for a broader regional escalation.
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Though Hamas had hoped for more direct involvement from these regional actors, the group ultimately launched the attack without their immediate assistance. The precise reasons for this decision remain unclear, but the timing suggests several geopolitical factors. For instance, by mid-2023, Israel had been on the verge of deploying a new, advanced air defence system, which Hamas feared could thwart their assault if they delayed any further, the New York Times reported.
Additionally, the warming relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia – a potential breakthrough in regional diplomacy – likely pushed Hamas to act before these ties could solidify.
The internal turmoil within Israel also played a role. By 2023, Israel had been grappling with mass protests and political unrest sparked by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s controversial judicial overhaul. Hamas leaders saw Israel’s “internal situation” as a key vulnerability, reasoning that the state was distracted by its own domestic crises and, therefore, more susceptible to a major attack.
Plot For A 9/11-Style Attack
One of the most chilling revelations from these documents is Hamas’s original plan to carry out a 9/11-style bombing in Israel, targeting the iconic Azrieli Towers in Tel Aviv, the Washington Post reported. These skyscrapers house offices, a shopping mall, and a central train station. The plan envisioned a devastating strike reminiscent of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, with the aim of toppling the towers and causing mass casualties.
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However, after months of discussions, Hamas concluded that it lacked the capability to execute such an ambitious plan. The group scrapped the 9/11-style bombing, along with other audacious proposals, such as using horse-drawn carriages as a “fast and light mechanism” to transport fighters across Israeli defences without arousing suspicion.
By September 2022, Hamas leaders believed they were ready to launch their attack, beginning with strikes on Israeli military bases before expanding to civilian areas. However, the assault was again postponed. Sinwar and his top commanders continued to refine the plan, holding covert meetings with Iranian officials and planning a broader regional conflict, the reports claimed.
Element Of Surprise
One of the key factors behind the success of Hamas’s attack on October 7 was its ability to mislead Israeli intelligence. For nearly two years, Hamas carefully cultivated the impression that it was more focused on governing Gaza and avoiding conflict with Israel. According to the documents, this deception was deliberate, with Hamas leadership frequently discussing the need to lull Israel into a false sense of security.
In April 2022, after the Muslim holy month of Ramzan passed without major incidents, Hamas leaders expressed relief that they had been able to “camouflage the big idea.” According to the findings, by avoiding skirmishes, Hamas convinced Israel that it was not planning a major offensive. The group continued this strategy throughout 2022 and 2023.
To ensure the success of this deception, Hamas kept its plans tightly compartmentalised. Only a select few of its senior commanders, including Sinwar and Ismail Haniyeh, the group’s political leader in Qatar, who was recently killed in Tehran, were privy to the full extent of the attack plans. Lower-ranking operatives were not informed until mere hours before the assault, the findings claim.
The Decision To Strike
After years of planning and months of preparation, Hamas finally decided to strike on October 7, 2023. The timing was significant: it coincided with Simhat Torah, a Jewish holiday when Israel would be vulnerable due to holiday observances and lower military readiness. The group debated launching the attack earlier, on Yom Kippur in late September, but ultimately chose Simhat Torah as the optimal moment, the findings claim.
Photo Credit: Getty
On the morning of October 7, Hamas militants crossed into southern Israel, executing a devastating multi-pronged attack. The group’s fighters targeted Israeli military bases, and civilian communities, and took hundreds of hostages, many of whom remain in captivity in Gaza.
While Hamas launched the attack without the immediate participation of its regional allies, the conflict quickly escalated beyond Gaza’s borders. Within 24 hours of the assault, Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed militant group based in Lebanon, began firing missiles at Israeli positions along the northern border. This opened a second front in the conflict, with the possibility of further escalation involving Iran and its regional proxies.
What Iran Said
The extent of Iran and Hezbollah’s involvement in the October 7 attack remains a subject of debate. Iranian leaders have denied direct involvement, with Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stating that Tehran was not responsible for the planning or execution of the assault. US and Israeli intelligence agencies have also suggested that key Iranian officials may have been caught off-guard by the timing of the attack.
Iran’s permanent mission to the United Nations in New York rejected the claims linking Tehran to Hamas’ October 7 surprise attack.
The Iranian mission responded to questions from The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal, saying, “While Hamas officials based in (the Qatari capital) Doha have announced that they had no information about the operation and solely Hamas’ military wing based in Gaza had been responsible for the planning, deciding about and directing the operation, any claim aiming to partially or entirely link the operation to Iran or Hezbollah is invalid and comes from fabricated documents.”
