Three decades ago, when women now entering their 40s became fertile, East Asian governments had reason to celebrate. If a South Korean woman behaved the same way as her older compatriots, she would emerge from her childbearing years with 1.7 offspring on average, down from 4.5 in 1970. Across the region, policymakers had brought down teenage pregnancies dramatically. The drop in birth rates, which occurred over the span of a single generation, was a stunning success. That was until it carried on. And on.
A South Korean woman who is now becoming fertile will have on average just 0.7 children during her childbearing years if she follows the example of her older peers. Since 2006 the country’s government has spent around $270bn, or just over 1% of GDP a year, on baby-making incentives, such as tax breaks for parents, maternity care and even state-sponsored dating. When birth rates first began to fall, few could have imagined how much harder it would be to get women to have more children, rather than fewer. Officials would love just some of the “missing” births back.
